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Abstract—Large-scale COVID-19 infections have occurred
worldwide, which has caused tremendous impact on the economy
and people’s lives. The traditional method for tracing contagious
virus, for example, determining the infection chain according
to the memory of infected people, has many drawbacks. With
the continuous spread of the pandemic, many countries or
organizations have started to study how to use mobile devices
to trace COVID-19, aiming to help people automatically record
information about incidents with infected people through tech-
nologies, reducing the manpower required to determine the
infection chain and alerting people at risk of infection. This
article gives an overview on various Bluetooth-based COVID-
19 proximity tracing proposals including centralized and de-
centralized proposals. We discussed the basic workflow and the
differences between them before providing a survey of five typical
proposals with explanations of their design features and benefits.
Then, we summarized eight security and privacy design goals
for Bluetooth-based COVID-19 proximity tracing proposals and
applied them to analyze the five proposals. Finally, open problems
and future directions are discussed.
Index Terms—COVID-19, Bluetooth-based, proximity tracing,
security, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
THE COronaVIrus Disease of 2019, referred to as COVID-19, has become a global pandemic and caused tens of
millions of infected people and hundreds of thousands of
death. The large-scale virus infection has caused tremendous
impact on people’s livelihood and the economy of many
countries. Many countries have to shut down cities to restrain
the development of the pandemic and prevent people from
working and traveling. Therefore, how to effectively curb
the spread of COVID-19 has become one of the focuses of
researches.
Traditionally, to trace people who may be at risk of in-
fection, the infected person needs to actively recall where
they have been and who they have contacted during the
infection period. Experts trace the people at risk of infection
by constructing a relationship network and isolate them to cut
off the source of infection. However, relying on the memory
of the infected person is likely to miss key information. When
the infected person went to a place where there were lots of
people gathered, he/she could not enumerate those strangers
who had come into close contact with him/her, which made it
difficult for experts to analyze.
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After the COVID-19 outbreak, many countries or organiza-
tions have begun to study the use of technological means to
trace people who may be infected and deployed applications
accordingly. These applications are expected to reduce the
labor required to determine infection chains and improve the
accuracy of tracing virus infections. There are already dozens
of COVID-19 tracing applications. Due to the inevitable need
to collect certain user information, how to protect their security
and privacy has become the focus of researchers. The tracing
applications can be divided into three categories based on
the data collected: location data, proximity data and mixed
data that includes the former two. Location data can be
obtained by using Global Positioning System (GPS) to identify
user’s latitude and longitude, while proximity data can be
obtained by using the Bluetooth function on the mobile device.
Bluetooth classifies close contacts with a significantly lower
false positive rate than GPS, especially in indoor environments,
and it consumes lower battery [1]. These Bluetooth-based
applications are basically created based on five Bluetooth-
based COVID-19 proximity tracing proposals.
In this article, we focus on the Bluetooth-based COVID-
19 proximity tracing proposals, which can be divided into
centralized proposals and decentralized proposals. Firstly, we
summarized the basic workflows of the two categories of pro-
posals and the differences between them. Then we specifically
analyzed two decentralized and three centralized proposals’
generation algorithms of anonymous IDs, locally stored data,
uploaded data and so on. Moreover, we summarized eight se-
curity and privacy design goals of proximity tracing proposals
and analyzed the five proposals according to them. We found
that none of them has achieved the goals. Finally, we shed
light on open problems and opportunities of Bluetooth-based
COVID-19 proximity tracing proposals.
II. OVERVIEW OF BLUETOOTH-BASED PROXIMITY
TRACING PROPOSALS
With the continuous spread of the COVID-19 all over
the world, many countries or organizations have successively
announced Bluetooth-based proximity tracing proposals. The
following are five typical proposals. In Asia, Singapore an-
nounced a privacy preserving protocol called BlueTrace [1].
In Europe, the Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity
Tracing project, referred to as PEPP-PT [2], comprises more
than 130 members across eight European countries. Frances
Inria and Germanys Fraunhofer, as members of PEPP-PT,
shared a ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing
protocol, referred to as ROBERT [3]. The Decentralised
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2Privacy- Preserving Proximity Tracing proposal, referred to
as DP-3T [4], is an open protocol that ensures personal
data and computation stay entirely on an individuals phone,
and this proposal was produced by a team of members
from across Europe. In North America, under the influence
of DP-3T [4], Google and Apple announced a two-phase
exposure notification solution, referred to as GAEN [5]. In the
first phase, they released Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) that allow applications from health authorities to work
across Android and iOS devices. In the second phase, this
capability will be introduced at the operating system level to
help ensure broad adoption [6]. Many applications are created
based on these five proposals. Based on BlueTrace, Singa-
pore deployed the application called TraceTogether, which
is the world’s first Bluetooth-based proximity tracing system
deployed nationwide. The COVIDSafe application was also
created based on BlueTrace and announced by the Australian
Government. PEPP-PT has been implemented in Germany
and they deployed the application called NTK. The French
government has deployed the StopCovid application based on
ROBERT to trace COVID-19. Ketju based on DP-3T was
trialed in Finland and it’s among the first to use a decentralised
approach to proximity tracing based on DP-3T in Europe.
Many countries have released open source applications based
on GAEN, such as Corona-Warn-App [7] in Germany, Stopp
Corona in Austria, SwissCovid in Switzerland, Immuni in Italy
and COVID Tracker in Ireland.
A. Centralized and Decentralized Proposals
According to the role of the server in the proximity tracing
proposals, Bluetooth-based proximity tracing proposals can
be divided into two categories. One is centralized proximity
tracing proposals, such as BlueTrace of Singapore, PEPP-PT
of Europe and ROBERT of France. The other is decentralized
proximity tracing proposals, such as GAEN and DP-3T of
Europe. Figure 1 (a) (b) shows the workflows of centralized
and decentralized proposals, respectively.
In the centralized proximity tracing proposals, users broad-
cast and receive encounter information (anonymous ID, trans-
mission time, etc.) via Bluetooth. When users are infected with
COVID-19, they can upload the encounter information to a
central server, which analyzes the encounter information and
determines whether any related user is at risk of infection and
notifies them. The server plays a vital role in the workflow of
centralized proposals and can handle the encounter informa-
tion between users and analyze it.
In the decentralized proximity tracing proposals, when users
are infected with COVID-19, the keys related to the generation
of anonymous IDs is uploaded to the server. Then the server
simply passes the keys of these positive users to other users,
who regenerate anonymous IDs and analyze whether they are
at risk of infection. The server only plays the role of storing
and distributing keys uploaded.
The difference analysis between centralized and decentral-
ized proposals is shown in Table I. The back-end server
using the centralized proposals handles each user’s pseudonym
(unique pseudo-random identifier) and encounter information.
Users tested positive
Server
Users potentially infected
Encounter 
information 
Handle all the user pseudonyms, anonymous 
IDs and encounter information uploaded. 
Do matching and risk calculation.
Alerts
Users tested positive
Server
Other users 
    keys
Do matching and 
risk calculation. 
Alerts
    keys
Handle all the keys uploaded.
(a) 
(b) 
Fig. 1. Workflows of Centralized and Decentralized Proposals: (a) Central-
ized; (b) Decentralized.
The weakness is that it can associate all the anonymous IDs
of each user with his pseudonym. This allows operators of
back-end servers to monitor user’s behaviors. The centralized
tracing proposals have been strongly criticized by privacy
advocates and other stakeholders in the technical community,
who believe that the centralized tracing proposals provide the
government with information that can be used to reverse-
engineer personal information about individuals [8]. Singapore
and Italy have stated that they will switch from centralized
applications to decentralized applications. The issue of trust
has also prompted the German government favoring a central-
ized proposal before to adopt a decentralized one. The French
Parliament debated similar concerns.
B. Comparison Between Proximity Tracing Proposals
In this section, the two decentralized proximity tracing
proposals (Table II introduces GAEN and three designs of
DP-3T) and the three centralized proximity tracing proposals
(Table III introduces BlueTrace, PEPP-PT and ROBERT) are
analyzed.
The two decentralized proposals have roughly similar pro-
cesses, and the specific difference is reflected in the different
algorithms for generating anonymous IDs. In the low-cost
design, the seed keys of one user are linkable. In the formula,
H represents the hash function and t represents the current
day, the seed key of which can be hashed to generate that
of the next day. Thus only the seed key of the first day is
needed to generate all the anonymous IDs for the next few
3TABLE I
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED PROPOSALS
Centralized Decentralized
Information obtained by
the server
All the user pseudonyms, anonymous IDs and en-
counter information uploaded by the users tested
positive
All the keys uploaded by users tested positive
The role that the server
plays
Analyze the information obtained and determine
whether the related users may be at risk of infection
Store and distribute the keys
The data volume commu-
nicated between the mo-
bile device and the server
The data uploaded by the users tested positive is
small
The server needs to periodically distribute keys to
all the users, which means the data volume greatly
exceeds that of the centralized proposals
days. AnonoID represents an anonymous ID. PRF is a pseudo-
random function. PRG is a pseudorandom generator. Str is a
fixed, public string. Each seed key can be used to generate all
the anonymous IDs of the day. In the formula of the unlinkable
design, Epochs i are encoded relative to a fixed starting point
shared by all the entities. LEFT128 takes the leftmost 128 bits
of the hash output. This design generates a seed key for each
epoch i and hashes it to generate anonymous IDs. Thus, all of
these seek keys are unlinkable. The user can choose the time
period for uploading, then the server regenerates these hash
values based on the seed key uploaded by the user and puts
them into a cuckoo filter before sending them to other users.
Compared with the low-cost design, the unlinkable design
provides better privacy attributes with increased bandwidth.
The hybrid design uses a time window w, whose length is
an integer multiple of the anonymous ID’s valid period, to
reduce the valid period of a seed key. The user can also select
the time period and time window w for uploading. Compared
with low-cost designs, this design requires more bandwidth
and storage space, but less than that of the unlinkable design.
GAEN is similar to the hybrid design of DP-3T. It corresponds
to the case where the time window of the hybrid design is
one day but has been upgraded in the generation algorithm of
anonymous ID. In the formula, SecSeed represents secondary
seek key and PriSeed represents primary seek key. HKDF is a
key derivation algorithm. It first generates a primary seed key
every day that is unassociated with each other. Then it uses
the primary seed key to generate a secondary seed key, which
is used to generate an anonymous ID.
The servers in the three centralized proposals all grasp
user pseudonyms, anonymous IDs and encounter information
uploaded. BlueTrace needs to collect user’s phone number and
associate the number with user’s pseudonym. Their differences
are also mainly reflected in the different algorithms for gener-
ating anonymous IDs. In addition to generating an anonymous
ID using a key known only to itself, the server in ROBERT
also uses the anonymous ID and a key known only to itself to
generate encrypted country code to implement the proposal
across the country. In these proposals, the server plays an
important role.
In the decentralized proposals, the users tested positive store
the encounter information broadcast by other users on mobile
device, and upload the keys that generate the anonymous IDs.
While in the centralized proposals, the users tested positive
store and upload the encounter information broadcast by other
users. The server handles users pseudonyms and anonymous
IDs. So as long as a user uploads the encounter information,
the server can infer whether there are related users at risk of
infection. In the decentralized proposals, because the server
is responsible for storing and distributing data, users need to
upload keys so that other users can acquire keys and regenerate
anonymous IDs to match.
DP-3T proposes three different decentralized designs with
different bandwidth and privacy requirements. The low-cost
design requires the minimum bandwidth and provides the
weakest privacy. The unlinkable design requires the maximum
bandwidth and provides the strongest privacy. And the band-
width and privacy of the hybrid design is between the low-
cost design and the unlinkable design. GAEN is similar to
the hybrid design of DP-3T, but it has a better anonymous ID
generation algorithm. In the above three centralized proposals,
the information collected from users and the anonymous ID
generation algorithm are different. BlueTrace needs to collect
the user’s phone number, while ROBERT does not need.
ROBERT uses a secret key known only to the server to encrypt
the country/region code as part of encounter information, while
the other two proposals do not. In decentralized proposals, a
user uploads keys related to his/her own anonymous IDs to
the server. But in centralized proposals, the user uploads the
encounter information related to other users’ anonymous IDs
to the server.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF
BLUETOOTH-BASED PROXIMITY TRACING PROPOSALS
A. Security Analysis
This section summarizes the security design goals required
for the Bluetooth-based proximity tracing proposals based on
six types of threats proposed in the STRIDE Threat Model of
Microsoft [9] and analyzes the security of five proposals.
1) Security Design Goals: Eight security design goals are
as follows.
Information confidentiality. Attackers cannot obtain infor-
mation transmitted by users through wireless communication.
Information integrity. When transmitting and storing en-
counter information, these proposals should ensure that the
information is not tampered by unauthorized entities or can
be discovered afterwards.
Normal reception. A user can normally receive the in-
formation broadcast by the other users after granting the
application permission.
4TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE TWO DECENTRALIZED PROXIMITY TRACING PROPOSALS
Decentralized
GAEN
DP-3T
1. Low-cost design 2. Unlinkable design 3. Hybrid design
Personal information None None
User pseudonym None None
Generation
algorithm of
anonymous ID
SecSeedt =
HKDF (PriSeedt)
AnonIDi =
PRG(SecSeedt, i)
Seedt = H(Seedt−1)
AnonID1|| · · · ||AnonIDn =
PRG(PRF (Seedt, str))
AnonIDi =
LEFT128(H(Seedi))
AnonIDw,1|| · · · ||AnonIDw,n =
PRG(PRF (Seedw, str))
Generating location Mobile device Mobile device
Identity of infected
users
The server does not
know
The server does not know
Data saved on mo-
bile devices
Anonymous ID
and Associated
Encrypted Metadata
(version and transmit
power level)
Anonymous ID , exposure mea-
surement (for example, signal
attenuation) and receiving date
Hash string of anonymous
ID and time, exposure mea-
surement and receiving date
Anonymous ID, exposure measure-
ment, time window for receiving
anonymous ID
Data uploaded (PriSeedt, t) (Seedt, t) (Seedi, i) in the time period
selected
(Seedw, w) in the time period se-
lected
Processing of big data. The application works normally
when it receives a large amount of encounter information.
Avoidance of false contact. Only when two users have
close contact can they receive the information broadcast by
each other.
Real identity. An attacker cannot claim to be a certain user.
Authorization. The user tested positive needs authorization
or identity verification before uploading data to the server.
Non-repudiation. Users cannot deny that they have had
close contact with someone.
2) Security Analysis of Proposals: The analysis of these
five proposals’ achievement of the security design goals is as
follows.
Information confidentiality. In all the proposals, a user
broadcasts information to the other nearby users via Bluetooth.
In this process, attackers can use tools, such as sniffer, to
obtain massages broadcast by users. But attackers cannot
obtain valid information by analyzing these messages due
to using the generation algorithm of anonymous IDs. In
decentralized proposals, only users who may be at risk of
infection can do risk calculation. In centralized proposals,
only servers can decrypt the encounter information and obtain
confidential information about users.
Information integrity. In the two decentralized proposals,
if the seed keys uploaded by users tested positive are tampered,
other users cannot regenerate real anonymous IDs based on
the false keys. In GAEN, anonymous IDs and Associated
Encrypted Metadata (AEM) are both encrypted. If they are
tampered, the encounter information regenerated by users
based on the real seed keys cannot match them. In DP-3T,
if the anonymous IDs or the hash value of the anonymous
IDs in the encounter information is tampered, the anonymous
IDs regenerated based on the seed keys cannot match them.
In PEPP-PT, the anonymous IDs in the encounter information
are generated by the periodically changing seed keys. When
the user pseudonym decrypted is invalid, it can be determined
that the information has been tampered. In BlueTrace, there
are fields for integrity checking in the anonymous IDs. In
ROBERT, the Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the
encounter information can be used to check the integrity.
Normal reception. Any proximity tracing system based on
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is vulnerable to active attackers.
This attack may cause the normal recording of anonymous IDs
to stop working, thereby preventing a user from discovering
the other users. This is an inherent problem with this method.
Processing of big data. When an attacker sends a large
amount of encounter information to a user, the user’s applica-
tion may occupy too much memory to store the information,
which may cause the application to crash. To solve this
problem, the storage capacity can be set for the encounter
information, but this method will also cause the application
to be unable to receive more encounter information after the
encounter information fills up the memory. None of these five
proposals can deal with this problem.
Avoidance of false contact. For all the proposals, false
contact incidents cannot be completely avoided. The attacker
can record the information broadcast by a user and broadcast
it to victims as quickly as possible. If the user is later tested
positive, the victims will mistakenly believe that they are in
danger. Technically savvy attackers can use large antennas to
artificially increase their broadcast range. For attackers without
budget restriction, they may relay and broadcast anonymous
IDs extensively to create large-scale false contact incidents.
All the proposals resist these attacks to the greatest extent by
limiting the validity period of anonymous IDs but it cannot
solve this problem completely.
Real identity. All the proposals use specific encryption
algorithms to prevent the attacker from deriving seed keys or
user pseudonyms based on the collected anonymous IDs, so
the attacker cannot pretend to be a certain user.
5TABLE III
COMPARISON OF THE THREE CENTRALIZED PROXIMITY TRACING PROPOSALS
Centralized
BlueTrace PEPP-PT ROBERT
Personal information Phone number Not clear None
User pseudonym A unique random identity A unique random identity A unique random identity
Generation algorithm of
anonymous ID
Use seed key only known to sever
to encrypt user pseudonym, cre-
ation time and expiration time
Use seed key periodically gen-
erated by server to encrypt user
pseudonym
Use seed key only known to sever
to encrypt user pseudonym and the
epoch
Generating location The server The server The server
Identity of infected users The server knows Not clear The server knows user pseudonyms
but cannot link to users identity
Data saved on mobile de-
vices
Anonymous ID, Received Signal
Strength Indication (RSSI), Device
Model, timestamp, etc.
Anonymous ID, metadata and op-
tional device information and de-
vice status (RSSI and TX/RX
power), timestamp and optional
further data (such as WiFi status)
Encrypted country code, anony-
mous ID, timestamp, Message
Authentication Code (MAC) and
transmission time
Data uploaded Data saved on mobile devices Data saved on mobile devices Data saved on mobile devices
Authorization. In all the proposals, users infected with
COVID-19 can upload data to the server only after being
authorized by health authorities.
Non-repudiation. In the centralized proposals, the server
handles user pseudonyms, anonymous IDs generated based
on the user pseudonyms and encounter information uploaded.
When two users have proximity contacts, they will send
encounter information including anonymous IDs to each other.
When one user is tested positive and uploads encounter
information to the server, the other user cannot deny the prox-
imity contact with him/her because the sever can get another
user’s pseudonym from the anonymous ID in the encounter
information. In the decentralized proposals, if one user is
tested positive and uploads keys to the server and another
user gets the keys, regenerates and matches the anonymous
IDs successfully, the user cannot deny the proximity contact
with another user because the keys are only known to him/her.
Based on above analysis, we listed the achievement of the
five proximity tracing proposals for eight security design goals,
as shown in Table IV. It can be seen that none of the five
proposals can achieve the security design goals of normal
reception, processing of big data and avoidance of false con-
tacts. And all can achieve the design goals of confidentiality,
integrity, real identity, authorization and non-repudiation.
B. Privacy Analysis
This section summarizes the eight privacy design goals
required for the Bluetooth-based proximity tracing proposals
based on six data protection principles of General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union [10] and
analyzes the privacy of the five proposals.
1) Privacy Design Goals: The eight privacy design goals
are as follows.
Right of access. Users shall have the right to obtain
confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning
them are being processed, and where that is the case, access to
the personal data and the following information: the purposes
of the processing, the categories of personal data concerned,
the period that personal data will be stored etc.
Data minimisation. Adequate, relevant and limited to what
is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are
processed.
Right to erasure. Users shall have the right to obtain the
erasure of personal data concerning them without undue delay
and the system shall have the obligation to erase personal data
without undue delay.
Storage limitation. Save the data for necessary limited time
and then erase it.
Untraceability. Users’ locations cannot be exposed based
on the information broadcast by them.
Protection of infected users. The identity of infected users
should not be exposed to unauthorized entities.
Protection of risky users. The identity of risky users should
not be exposed to unauthorized entities.
Protection of interaction information. The interaction
information which reflects close-range physical interactions
between users should not be exposed to unauthorized entities.
2) Privacy Analysis of Proposals: The analysis of the five
proposals’ privacy design goals is as follows.
Right of access. In all proposals, the applications provide
introduction to users before they use specific functions. They
inform users the permission users should grant, the purpose of
collecting the data, the data they will collect, the period that
personal data will be stored etc.
Data minimisation. All of the five proposals indicated
that the location information of mobile phones would not be
collected. The processing amount of personal data is limited
to the minimum amount of data required by the system, and
no unnecessary personal data is collected
Right to erasure. In the five proposals, users have the right
to stop using the applications and delete personal data at any
time.
Storage limitation. All of the five proposals limit the
number of days the data can be kept. Once the data expires,
it will be deleted, ensuring the accuracy of the stored data.
6TABLE IV
ACHIEVEMENT OF SECURITY DESIGN GOALS OF THE FIVE PROPOSALS
Security Design Goals GAEN DP-3T BlueTrace PEPP-PT ROBERT
Information confidentiality
√ √ √ √ √
Information integrity
√ √ √ √ √
Normal reception × × × × ×
Processing of big data × × × × ×
Avoidance of false contact × × × × ×
Real identity
√ √ √ √ √
Authorization
√ √ √ √ √
Non-repudiation
√ √ √ √ √
Untraceability. In the two decentralized proposals, since
users use encryption algorithms to generate anonymous IDs
that change periodically, other entities cannot link to users by
analyzing anonymous IDs they broadcast. In the three central-
ized proposals, other entities cannot link to user pseudonyms
by analyzing anonymous IDs unless they have encryption
keys. But encryption keys are only handled by servers. Con-
sequently, other entities cannot link to users by analyzing the
anonymous IDs they broadcast.
Protection of infected users. The data uploaded by the
infected user is not related to personal information. In the
decentralized proposals, the data uploaded is keys, and in
the centralized proposals, it is the encounter information.
However, attackers can determine that the user is uploading a
large amount of data to the server by tracing phone numbers
of health authorities or observing the network traffic, inferring
that the user has been tested for COVID-19 and diagnosed.
These attackers can be Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
network operators, or hackers who set up malicious access
points or sniff public WiFi networks.
Protection of risky users. In the two decentralized propos-
als, the server sends seed keys uploaded by the infected users
to the other users, who use the seed keys locally to regenerate
the anonymous IDs and calculate the risk score. These seed
keys are not associated with the identity of the user at risk
of infection, so the decentralized proposals will not disclose
information about the user at risk of infection to the others. In
PEPP-PT and ROBERT, all the users will periodically request
to the server to update the risk score. The format of the reply is
the same regardless of whether the user has a risk of infection.
Therefore, if the server is credible and the communication
channel is confidential, the eavesdropper cannot distinguish
which user has a risk of infection. In BlueTrace, because the
server uses user’s phone number to notify them of the risk
of COVID-19 infection, the information of the user with high
risk may be leaked through the attacker’s tracking of the health
authority’s phone number.
Protection of interaction information. In the two decen-
tralized proposals, the system will not disclose any information
about the interaction between two users to any entity. The
anonymous IDs derived from the keys uploaded by an infected
user has nothing to do with whoever had interacted with this
user. In the three centralized proposals, only the server can
learn an infected user’s interaction information by analyzing
the encounter information uploaded by the user. If the server
is trusted, the other unauthorized parties will not learn about
these interaction information.
Based on the above analysis, we listed the achievement
of the five proximity tracing proposals for the eight privacy
design goals, as shown in Table V. It can be seen that all the
proposals have achieved the same privacy in terms of right of
access, data minimisation, right to erasure, storage limitation,
untraceablility and protection of interaction information. And
none of them achieves the privacy goal of protecting infected
users. For the privacy design goal of protecting risky users,
since BlueTrace needs to collect users phone numbers, it may
disclose the information of users at risk of infection. In terms
of privacy analysis, BlueTrace achieves less privacy design
goals than the other proposals.
IV. OPEN PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
At present, the research on Bluetooth-based proximity trac-
ing proposals is still in the stage of continuous exploration,
and researchers face many challenges during this process.
A. Precise Proximity Measurement and Risk Calculation
Precise proximity measurement and risk calculation are
the key steps in tracing COVID-19. GAEN standardizes
four scores which are attenuationScore, daysSinceLastExpo-
sureScore, durationScore and transmissionRiskScore, and then
it multiples these scores to calculate the risk value of infection.
SwissCovid, which is based on GAEN, divides the attenuation
into three intervals by using two attenuation values before as-
signing different weight values to each interval. It uses GAEN
API to request users continuous attenuation time in different
intervals and get the risk value of infection by calculating
the weighted sum of continuous attenuation time. GAEN is
still evolving, and the measurement and calibration between
different operating systems and different mobile phone models
of these parameters such as attenuation values, continuous
contact time, thresholds and weights are still not completed.
To accurately estimate the distance between two users, GAEN
released a Bluetooth Low Energy RSSI Calibration Tool to
calibrate as many devices as possible. It collects the RSSI
Correction and the transmit power of different mobile phone
models to improve the calculation consistency of attenuation
values of all devices [11]. GAEN currently uses this rough
7TABLE V
ACHIEVEMENT OF PRIVACY DESIGN GOALS OF THE FIVE PROPOSALS
Privacy Design Goals GAEN DP-3T BlueTrace PEPP-PT ROBERT
Right of access
√ √ √ √ √
Data minimisation
√ √ √ √ √
Right to erasure
√ √ √ √ √
Storage limitation
√ √ √ √ √
Untraceability
√ √ √ √ √
Protection of infected users × × × × ×
Protection of risky users
√ √ × √ √
Protection of interaction information
√ √ √ √ √
calibration method as a stopgap measure. The United King-
dom believes that the method of GAEN measuring distance
through RSSI is inaccurate and creates its own centralized
tracing application. NHSX, the digital innovation unit of the
British National Health Service, released the NHS COVID-
19 application [12] and tried it out on the Isle of Wight, but
many technical challenges have been identified through system
testing.
Measuring the distance between users may consider the
mutual enhancement of Bluetooth and ultrasonic ranging. In
Bluetooth-based proximity tracing proposals, mobile devices
broadcast anonymous IDs using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE),
in which the attenuation of Bluetooth signals is generally
used to indirectly represent the distance between users. In
addition, ultrasound is also a way to measure distance, which
is more accurate and does not depend on special hardware.
In a scenario where the distance between users is greater
than the officially considered safe distance, the attenuation of
the Bluetooth signal can be used to represent the distance
between users, because this scenario does not require an
accurate distance measurement. When the users are in close
contact, for example, when the two users perform handshake
and other close actions, ultrasonic assisted ranging perhaps
can be triggered as needed at this time to provide calibration
for distance measurement.
B. Security and Privacy Guarantee
The researchers conducted experiments on the privacy and
security risks of GAEN in the real world. In this experiment,
the researchers proved that the current framework design is
vulnerable to two kinds of attacks [13]. One attack is to
profile the infected person and possibly de-anonymize it. The
researchers used mobile devices as a Bluetooth sniffer to
capture anonymous IDs broadcast by them passing through six
locations. The captured data appeared random and could not
be associated with a single user. However, after a user is tested
positive and continuously uploads the primary keys, the result
is completely different. By generating a users anonymous IDs
and matching with the anonymous IDs received by the Blue-
tooth sniffers at six locations, they can accurately know which
locations the user has visited, and the users route map can be
portrayed based on the time information. Thus, they can collect
a lot of information about the user and cancel its anonymity.
Because the code of GAEN is not open source and the API
can only be used by health authorities, an analog tracker that
conforms to the anonymous ID encryption specification in
the GAEN API is used in this experiment. Another type of
attack is a relay-based wormhole attack, in which an attacker
constructs a fake contact event and may seriously affect a
tracing application built on GAEN. The researchers built a
multi-location wormhole by integrating Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) and the Raspberry Pi. First, the worm device sends
the encounter information collected from a location to the
central Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) server.
The server distributes the received messages among the worm
devices. These devices will copy the beacon within the validity
period of the anonymous ID (10 minutes) and rebroadcast. Fi-
nally, the researchers established a logical connection between
the mobile devices 40 kilometers away, but in fact they did not
have real contacts. This wormhole attack budget is relatively
low, and attackers can use higher-than-normal signal strength
and/or high-gain antennas to significantly increase the scope
of each wormhole device. Therefore, an attacker may establish
false connections between a large number of users and expand
the number of people who need to be tested and isolated,
causing unnecessary panic. Because GAEN is unavailable, the
researchers used DP-3T that inspired GAEN as an alternative.
All the COVID-19 tracing applications designed based on
GAEN are vulnerable to these two attacks. For the centralized
proposals, since the server handles every users pseudonym,
each user can be monitored. Thus it is necessary to ensure
that the server is credible and will not disclose information.
To promote the progress of these proposals in terms of
security and privacy, governments or research institutions can
open-source their proposals and use everyone’s power to find
a better evolutionary direction.
C. Interoperability of Applications
GAEN develops a Bluetooth-based proximity tracing system
on Android and iOS platforms to improve the security and
privacy of the Bluetooth function used in the proposal, but the
framework may not be available on other platforms [8]. The
European countries believe that Apples mobile phones restrict
the use of Bluetooth background scanning by third-party appli-
cations. Their users mobile devices need to keep Bluetooth on
and active at all times, which will negatively affect battery life
and device availability, making their own proposals impossible
and turning to GAEN to build applications. In addition, when
8performing accurate proximity measurements based on radio
signal strength, devices with different technical characteristics
need to be considered.
D. Large-scale User Group
To ensure the validity of the proximity tracing applications,
a large number of users must download these applications
and grant application permissions. When only a small number
of people choose to use tracing applications, none of these
proposals can play their true role. To protect the privacy of
users, users infected with COVID-19 can decide whether to
upload data to the server in the five proposals mentioned
above. If only some users choose to upload data, these propos-
als cannot effectively trace COVID-19. The applications are
unavailable in areas lacking the 3rd or 4th generation mobile
communication technologies. And for the elderly, children,
and people with difficult family conditions, they may not
have qualified mobile devices and consequently cannot use
these applications. For example, the smartphone penetration in
India and Bangladesh is very low, which is 25.3% and 18.5%,
respectively [14]. Moreover, in some countries or regions that
are highly concerned about personal privacy, the security and
privacy risks of the applications are also a reason that prevents
people from using them.
The government should increase publicity efforts for such
type of applications on the basis of protecting users safety and
privacy and try to implement this function on other portable
devices to reduce the threshold for using them [15].
E. Powerful Infection Detection Capability
In any country, ensuring a strong COVID-19 infection test
capability is the basis for preventing the spread of COVID-
19. Health authorities must be able to test accuratly whether
people are infected with COVID-19 on a large scale so that
these auxiliary tracing proposals can achieve their functions.
If users fail to test in time and get accurate test results when
they are informed of the risk of COVID-19 infection, their
enthusiasm for using such applications will be reduced.
The government should take responsibility of testing
COVID-19 for the public, providing convenient and affordable
testing approaches for them.
V. CONCLUSION
With the global pandemic of COVID-19, how to use tech-
nology to assist in tracing and suppressing the spread of
COVID-19 has become one of the focuses of researchers.
This article gives an overview on Bluetooth-based COVID-
19 proximity tracing proposals. We categorized the protocols
into two categories and summarized the differences between
them. Then we specifically analyzed the five protocols and
summarized their features and benefits. For a deeper com-
prehension, we summarized eight security and privacy design
goals of proximity tracing proposals and analyzed the five
proposals’ achievement of these goals. We found that none
of them has achieved the design goals. Moreover, we shed
light on the numerous open issues and opportunities that need
further research efforts from the technical requirements and
community building perspectives.
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